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Abstract 
We show that if firms in an industry engage in third-degree price discrimination, the number of firms in the free-entry 
equilibrium may be inefficiently low. This result is obtained even with set up costs and a price above marginal cost. 
We discuss the relevant implications that our result has for policy design.
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1 Introduction
The notion that free entry was desirable from a social point of view had long been widespread
among economists. However, contributions such as von Weizsaker (1980), Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) questioned this belief, and it is now
widely acknowledged that in a market with set up costs, free entry plus price over marginal
cost implies excessive entry whenever there is business-stealing, see Mankiw and Whinston
(1986). This is because entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to society, because
part of the entrant’s revenues is business stolen from incumbent competitors.
Mankiw and Whinston’s result is strongest when applied to oligopolies with homogeneous
products, and it provides a clear, simple rule to evaluate the eﬀect of entry on welfare. There
is an important policy implication that emanates from this result, namely that regulating
entry may bring about welfare gains. Some recent contributions, such as Ghosh and Morita
(2007a, b) have revisited the issue of social desirability of free entry in a successive vertical
oligopoly and in a bilateral oligopoly setting. They ﬁnd that, contrary to Mankiw and
Whinston’s initial result, free entry might lead to a socially insuﬃcient number of ﬁrms.
These contributions highlight the fact that policy design might have to take into account
important factors omitted so as to evaluate the social desirability of a policy that limits entry
in an industry.
We contribute to this debate by introducing the possibility of competitors engaging in third-
degree price discrimination. By combining price discrimination with imperfect competition,
we also contribute to the literature on the consequences of price discrimination on competition,
reviewed in Stole (2007). We show that if ﬁrms in an industry sell to consumers that belong
to diﬀerent segments with diﬀerent demand elasticities, and ﬁrms have the ability to price
discriminate, free entry might lead to an insuﬃcient number of ﬁrms. Indeed, entry may
be insuﬃcient even if in at least one market the price is above marginal cost and there is
aggregate business stealing, deﬁned as a reduction in total output per ﬁrm.
A necessary condition for free entry to lead to an insuﬃcient number of ﬁrms is that there
is market expansion in at least one segment with a positive markup. Market expansion in a
particular segment may occur since ﬁrms react to entry by rearranging the prices that they
charge in each submarket: if the price reduction is high enough in a high-margin segment,
individual output in this particular segment may increase after entry. We show that the
positive impact on welfare of this market expansion may more than oﬀset the negative impact
of business stealing in the other segment, even if total output per ﬁrm decreases. For instance,
consider the restaurant industry, and assume that there are two groups of consumers, which
constitute the two demand segments: those that eat à la carte, with low elasticity of demand,
and those that choose a ﬁxed-price menu, with high elasticity of demand. For any arbitrary
number of ﬁrms in the industry, it is reasonable to expect the equilibrium margin to be
higher in the former segment than in the latter. Now, following entry, it may be the case
that restaurants choose to reduce the margin in the à la carte segment enough to increase
the number of à la carte customers in each restaurant, even though the total number of
customers per restaurant decreases. Our theoretical result points out that, if this is the case,
free entry in this industry may be ineﬃciently low, provided that the margin in the à la carte
segment is high enough.
In addition to presenting our main result in Proposition 1, we discuss two examples using
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speciﬁc demand functions, each emphasizing a particular aspect of our contribution. Our
analysis does not invalidate Mankiw and Whinston’s result, since it remains valid considering
markets in isolation. However, if we consider the industry as a whole and ﬁrms are allowed
to price-discriminate, it could be the case that business stealing and positive margins are
consistent with ineﬃciently low entry. Thus, a policy that restricts entry that is based
exclusively on Mankiw and Whinston’s analysis could have detrimental eﬀects on welfare.
Hence, the whole purpose of this exercise is to stress the fact that, under non-standard
conditions, some welfare calculations may be incorrect and policy design must take into
account the speciﬁc setting that it is dealing with.
Section 2 presents the model and the fundamental proposition. Section 3 discusses the
linear demand examples, and Section 4 presents some conclusions.
2 The model
Assume that consumers may be classiﬁed into two groups, giving rise to inverse demand
functions p1 = P1(Q1) and p2 = P2(Q2), with P 0
i < 0, i = 1,2, and where Q1 and Q2 are total
























with c(0) = 0, c0, c00 ≥ 0. Since all ﬁrms have the same production cost, the equilibrium will
be symmetric, with all ﬁrms producing q1 in the ﬁrst market and q2 in the second market,
and Q1 = n · q1 and Q2 = n · q2.








P2(t)dt − n · (F + c(q1 + q2)).
Computing the derivative with respect to n, we obtain
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Now, deﬁning individual proﬁts as
π(n) = p1q1 + p2q2 − c(q1 + q2) − F
rearranging terms,
W








0 (q1 + q2)). (1)
Deﬁne business stealing as
∂ (q1 + q2)
∂n
< 0
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Notice that our deﬁnition of business stealing considers the combination of both markets.
Indeed, it could be the case that there is business stealing in one of the markets, but not in
the other market. Further assume that there is free entry in the industry, i.e. π(n) = 0. If
this is the case, Proposition 1 presents the basic result of this note:
Proposition 1. The free-entry equilibrium may lead to an insuﬃciently low number of ﬁrms,











































If output per ﬁrm increases in the ﬁrst market, then it has to decrease in the second market.
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. Therefore, entry will be insuﬃcient if the assumptions made in this proposition
are satisﬁed.
Our result applies to combinations of markets with diﬀerent enough demand elasticities.
An extreme situation is the case when the second market is perfectly competitive. Notice






0 (q1 + q2)). (2)
whose sign depends on whether individual output increases or decreases with the number
of ﬁrms, given that ﬁrms price above marginal cost. Therefore, if the ﬁrst market is not
perfectly competitive, entry will be insuﬃcient as long as individual output levels increase
with the number of active ﬁrms. In order for this to happen, we need an increasing marginal
cost and the ability to price discriminate. Next section presents an example using linear
demand functions, where there exist parameter values for which individual output levels in
the non-competitive market increase with the number of ﬁrms in the industry. This makes
the number of active ﬁrms in the free-entry equilibrium ineﬃciently low.
3 Examples
This section discusses two examples that illustrate our basic result. First, we consider the
existence of a competitive segment, and second, we propose a semi-collusive arrangement
that shows that, with market expansion, free entry may lead to insuﬃcient entry, even if
marginal costs are zero.
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3.1 Example 1
Assume ﬁrst two market segments with inverse demand functions




In the ﬁrst market segment, ﬁrms compete à la Cournot, whereas in the second segment,
we assume for simplicity that ﬁrms are price takers. Firms’ costs are given by c(q1 + q2) =
F + c · (q1 + q2)
2. Firms maximize proﬁts, which are deﬁned as:
π = (a − Q1)q1 + p2q2 −

F + c · (q1 + q2)
2
.
where q1 and q2 denote individual output levels in the ﬁrst and the second market segments,
respectively. Computing the derivative with respect to q1 and q2, we ﬁnd that:
∂π
∂q1
= a − Q1 − q1 − 2c · (q1 + q2) = 0;
∂π
∂q2
= p2 − 2c · (q1 + q2) = 0.
Assume that, with free entry, there are n ﬁrms in the industry. Of course, the value of n is
a function of F: the greater F, the smaller the number of entering ﬁrms. In that case, the
price in the perfectly competitive segment is:




This way, we solve for q1 and q2 to obtain:
q1 =
an
n(c(2r + 2) + 1) + 2cr + n2, q2 =
ar(1 + n)
n(c(2r + 2) + 1) + 2cr + n2.
Deriving individual ﬁrm output q1 + q2 with respect to n, we see that the derivative is
always negative, that is, there is always business stealing. Speciﬁcally,
∂ (q1 + q2)
∂n
= −
a (n2 r + 2nr + r + n2)
(2cnr + 2cr + n2 + 2cn + n)
2 < 0




a (2cr − n2)
(2cnr + 2cr + n2 + 2cn + n)
2
When F, r, or c are large enough to allow for a free-entry equilibrium number of ﬁrms n
such that n <
√
2rc, we have that
∂q1
∂n
> 0 and p2 − c
0 = 0
(recall that the second market is competitive). Applying the result in Proposition 1, there
is insuﬃcient entry. For example, when a = r = 10, c = 1 and F = 0.2, it may be easily
seen that the free-entry equilibrium involves two active ﬁrms. However, when n = 2, we
ﬁnd that
∂q1
∂n ≈ 0.0198 > 0 and the ﬁrm prices above marginal cost in the non-competitive
market. Speciﬁcally, the price in the non-competitive segment is 0.9429, whereas marginal
cost is 0.9143, which is of course equal to the price in the competitive segment. Applying
Proposition 1 and ignoring the integer constraint, welfare would increase by increasing the
number of ﬁrms relative to the free entry equilibrium, which involves two active ﬁrms.
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3.2 Example 2
In our second example, consider ﬁrms having access to technology that allows them to produce
at zero marginal cost. Let ﬁxed costs be F, identical for all ﬁrms. Assume that market
demand may be split into two segments. Demand in the ﬁrst segment is p = a − Q, and
assume any arbitrary functional form for the demand function in the second segment. Recall
that Mankiw and Whinston (1986) did not introduce any assumption regarding whether or
not the oligopoly is cooperative. We assume that ﬁrms agree to produce an individual output
given by
qi = 1 +
1
n
and output sold by each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst and second segments are, respectively,






Firms give away their production in the second segment, thus charging a zero price. Notice
that entry implies business stealing, speciﬁcally in the second segment. In this example, entry
leads to market expansion in the ﬁrst segment, whereas total output, and thus welfare in the
second segment, is independent of the number of ﬁrms in the industry. For instance, if the
demand function in the ﬁrst segment is p = 9 − Q, r = 0.7, and the ﬁxed entry cost is F = 5,
individual proﬁts and welfare (excluding the second market) are










Therefore, since π(3) = 41
300 and π(4) = −119
400, then there will be three ﬁrms operating in
the free-entry equilibrium, whereas the optimal number of ﬁrms is ﬁve, with W(5) = 891
200.
4 Conclusions
This note contributes to the literature that analyzes the social desirability of entry and is
intended to qualify the strong policy recommendation emanating from the analysis in Mankiw
and Whinston (1986). In particular, we show that, if ﬁrms are able to price discriminate,
business stealing and a positive margin may be consistent with insuﬃcient entry. In order for
this to happen, it is necessary to have some market expansion in at least one of the demand
groups as new ﬁrms enter. This result could aid in the design and evaluation of policies that
limits entry in a given industry.
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